DIVERGENT IMMIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES BY POLITICAL PARTIES IN EUROPE

YU JIN WOO

Department of Politics, University of Virginia, USA
E-mail: Yw3yt@virginia.edu

Abstract- This paper attempts to examine why political parties hold divergent preferences toward entry or integration policies on permanent migrants. While following traditional center-right and center-left dichotomy in understanding and identifying dissimilar party ideologies, I argue that citizenship law regime (jus soli or jus sanguinis) plays an essential role in constructing politicians' attitude. To test this hypothesis, I apply Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2014) dataset on political parties within European democracies in order to parse out dynamics evolving around in party-level calculations. A linear regression model with country fixed effects along with predicted probabilities support a significance of citizenship law regime when we study migration policies.

Index Terms- Citizenship Law, Party Ideology, Permanent Migrants, Political Partie.

I. INTRODUCTION

Why do political parties reveal dissimilar policy preferences on permanent migrants within domestically or cross nationally? This paper claims that citizenship law of a given country in conjunction with respective party ideology plays a vital role in formulating these divergent attitudes. To put it another way, party ideology shows dissimilar preferences across parties within a country while citizenship law explains cross-national difference. Here, I define citizenship law as a dichotomous measure – *jus soli* (by soil) and *jus sanguinis* (by blood), and I do the same for identifying party ideology – center-left and center-right. Based on these dimensions, this paper argues that the center-left party prefers more incorporating policies while parties in *jus soli* regime in general more strongly insist for overall liberal policies on permanent migrants.

II. HYPOTHESES: CITIZENSHIP AND PARTY IDEOLOGY

To understand political calculation of party members, I rest my argument on rational choice approach, which assumes that politicians' ultimate goal is to sustain their positions as party members, and thus, they would try to maximize their vote shares under democratic setting. In this sense, it is inevitable that citizenship law becomes essential in shaping politicians' attitude toward immigrants. In other words, whether migrants are capable of obtaining a political right becomes a matter of interest. In a country where migrants can acquire citizenship more easily, they become a new group within electorate, and therefore, politicians become motivated to attract them to increase their vote share. Thus, I predict;

H1 (citizenship law effect): Politicians in jus soli regime take interests of migrants more seriously, because their votes count.

This logic can be supported by national political process thesis, which claims that countries tend to grant more rights for immigrants in order to survive contestation via winning new votes from them [1]–[5].

Some might question validity of dichotomous categorization of citizenship law due to noncitizen franchise or naturalization (*jus domicilis*) process. Indeed, some countries allow permanent migrants to vote in municipal or provincial elections even without a full citizenship status. Moreover, in regards to *jus domicilis* principle, even if children of a permanent migrant cannot automatically obtain citizenship by birth in *jus sanguinis* countries, this may not be much of a concern, if these countries provide easier procedure to naturalize. Yet, previous researches show that noncitizen franchise is a relatively new concept [6] [7] [8] while *jus soli* countries tend to allow for a higher rate of naturalization [9]. Hence, a dichotomous measure on citizenship law can be safely applied in analysis.

While treating citizenship law as an essential variable in my argument, I take party ideology as an alternative variable that explains why parties in a given country also reveal different attitude toward permanent migrants. The recent scholarship points out the salience of new politics dimension [10] [11] [12]. They demonstrate that new post-material concerns induce divergent positions within a party, and this would cause intra-fragmentation [13]-[18].

If we apply this logic into overall migration issues, some members in a center-right party would prefer migrants due to economic reasons (i.e., open economy along with competition among private firms) while the others would not due to national security concerns. Similarly, some members in a center-left party would

be more pro-migrants under human rights reasons while the others would not in order to protect domestic labor market (i.e., aiming full employment along with extensive redistribution). Here, a compromised policy preference in center-right parties would be one that stresses economic migration through temporary scheme. Meanwhile center-left parties would emphasize family reunion channel, stressing integration. It yields my second hypothesis;

H2 (party ideology effect): Center-right party would prefer more restrictive policy vis-à-vis permanent migrants while limiting their rights. On the other, center-left party would prefer a policy that highly stresses integration while they may be indifferent about stock of immigrants.

Table 1. Summary of Variables

Dependent Variable	
IMMIGRATION _POLICY	Position on immigration policy (IMMIGRATE_POLICY) 0 (Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration) ~ 10 (Fully in favor)
MULTICULTURALISM	Position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism v assimilation) 0 (Strongly favors multiculturalism) ~ 10 (Strongly favors assimilation)
Independent Variables	
CITIZENSHIP	Binary (1 if *jus soli*, and 0 if *jus sanguinis*) Source: Fitzgerald et al. (2014)
PARTY	Position of the party in 2014 in terms of its overall ideological stance (LRGEN) 0 (Extreme left) ~ 5 (Center) ~ 10 (Extreme right)
Control Variables	
NT'L_SECURITY	Position towards international security and peacekeeping missions 0 (Strongly favors country troop deployment) ~ 10: (Strongly opposes)
CORRUPT_SALIENCE	Salience of reducing political corruption 0 (Not important at all) ~ 10 (Extremely important)
URBAN_RURAL	Position on urban versus rural interests 0 (Strongly supports urban interests) ~ 10 (Strongly supports rural interests)
ECON_POSITION	Ideological stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state (LRECON) 0 (Extreme left) ~ 5 (Center) ~ 10 (Extreme right)
EU_POSITION	Overall orientation of the party leadership toward European integration 1 (Strongly opposed) 2 (Opposed) 3 (Somewhat opposed) 4 (Neutral) 5 (Somewhat in favor) 6 (In favor) 7 (Strongly in favor)
TRADITION	Position on democratic freedoms and rights. "Liberation" or "post-materialist" parties favor expanded personal freedoms (i.e., access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation). "Traditional" or "Authoritarian" parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be f firm moral authority on social and cultural issues (GALTAN) 0 (Libertarian/ Post-materialist) ~ 5 (Center) ~ 10 (Traditional/ Authoritarian)
NATIONALISM	Position towards nationalism 0 (Strongly promotes cosmopolitan society) ~ 10 (Nationalist society)
ETHNIC_MINORITIES	Position towards ethnic minorities 0 (Strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities) ~ 10 (Strongly opposes)

Notes: 1) All variables (except citizenship law) are taken directly from Chapel Hill Expert Survey dataset.
2) Variable names in parentheses indicate original names listed in Chapel Hill Expert dataset.

III. DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND MODEL SPECIFICATION

In order to study preferences of political parties on migration issues, I mainly rely on Chapel Hill Expert Survey data for 2014 [19]. This dataset shows positioning of parties on issues, such as political ideology, European integration and domestic policies from 31 democracies in the Europe. Each variable in the dataset shows averaged value of evaluations by 337 experts. Since my interested outcome is a preference held by individual parties, this dataset allows me to observe different patterns of parties across and within countries. Moreover, this dataset is especially helpful to test my hypotheses, because it takes two separate dimensions on migrations; (1) a position on immigration policy (preference on restrictive policy on immigration), and (2) a position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism versus assimilation). This is helpful in parsing out parties' positions on both overall immigration issue and specifically integration issue. I posit that center-right party will be more inclined toward restrictive measures as well as assimilation while this tendency would be stronger in *jus sanguinis* regime, because integrating immigrants would not help them obtaining new votes under this citizenship law.

Table 2. Linear Regression with Country Fixed Effects

	Immigration Policy				Multiculturalism			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PARTY	.250**	.181*	.167#	.178*	.235**	.164#	.153#	.164#
	(.046)	(.084)	(.085)	(.085)	(.047)	(.091)	(.093)	(.092)
PARTY x CITIZENSHIP	-.136*	-.134*		-.128#	-.133*	-.124#		-.116
	(.066)	(.066)		(.069)	(.066)	(.072)		(.075)
INT'L_SECURITY			-.059	-.061			-.029	-.031
			(.070)	(.069)			(.076)	(.076)
CORRUPT_SALIENCE			-.015	-.005			-.027	-.017
			(.054)	(.054)			(.059)	(.059)
URBAN_RURAL			-.049	-.027			-.032	-.013
			(.060)	(.061)			(.065)	(.066)
ECON_POSITION		.037	.007	.016		.079	.060	.069
		(.069)	(.072)	(.072)		(.075)	(.078)	(.078)
EU_POSITION		.032	.003	.001		-.074	-.101	-.102
		(.050)	(.069)	(.068)		(.055)	(.075)	(.075)
TRADITION		.091	.104	.093	.096	.167*	.180*	.170*
		(.064)	(.072)	(.071)	(.062)	(.069)	(.078)	(.078)
NATIONALISM	.321**	.288**	.303**	.299**	.262**	.380**	.380**	.377**
	(.049)	(.068)	(.072)	(.072)	(.062)	(.074)	(.078)	(.078)
ETHNIC_MINORITIES	.447**	.436**	.420**	.433**	.425**	.220**	.204**	.215**
	(.058)	(.061)	(.064)	(.064)	(.060)	(.064)	(.068)	(.068)
Observation	199	199	198	198	199	200	199	199
R-Square	.8166	.8211	.8447	.8220	.8187	.8189	.8311	.8182

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.001, *p < 0.05, #p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses.

While most of variables are directly taken from Chapel Hill data, I have updated Fizgerald, Leblang, and Teets' [20] dataset to identify citizenship law of countries. This is a dummy variable that marks whether a country adopts *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis* regime. Along with identification of other variables, more details are recorded in <Table 1>.

The values of the two dependent variables (overall immigration policy and integration) are continuous, and their distributions are bell-shaped (histograms are not reported here). Thus, I use linear regression model with country fixed effects. What needs to be taken into account here is that citizenship law only varies across countries while a unit of analysis is an individual party. If I directly implement citizenship law variable

into a model, this effect will be washed out due to country fixed effects. Thus, I instead include this variable as an interaction term with party ideology variable. In sum, I estimate the following model:
Migration_Preference$_{ji}$ =


$$\alpha + \beta_1 Ideology_{ji} + \beta_2 Ideology_{ji} * Citizenship_{ji} + \beta_3 Intl_Security_{ji} + \beta_4 Corrupt_Salience_{ji} + \beta_5 Urban_Rural_{ji} + \beta_6 Econ_Position_{ji} + \beta_7 EU_Position_{ji} + \beta_8 Tradition_{ji} + \beta_9 Nationalism_{ji} + \beta_{10} Ethnic_Minorities_{ji} + v_j + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

In this equation, the dependent variable, *Migration_Preference*$_{ji}$, is applicable to both immigration and integration positioning, indicating policy preference of a party (*j*) in a country (*i*).

IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION


<Table 2> reports results for both dependent variables. When the model includes both party ideology and its interaction term with citizenship law, a coefficient of ideology shows its effect when citizenship law is 0 (*jus sanguinis*). Meanwhile, a summation of coefficients of ideology and interaction term represents the ideology's effect when citizenship law is 1 (*jus soli*). Overall, party ideology seems to be statistically significant in both regimes, and parties' tendency to prefer anti-immigration or assimilation policy decreases as a country grants its citizenship based on birthplace. In order to more accurately examine the effects of citizenship law and party ideology, I turn to predicted probabilities.

Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities for Citizenship Law



	Immigration Policy	Multiculturalism
Jus Sanguinis (= 0)	5.202***	5.339***
	(.089)	(.096)
Jus Soli (= 1)	4.538***	4.740***
	(.299)	(.327)

Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities of Party Ideology at Each Citizenship Regime



	Immigration Policy	Multiculturalism
Jus Sanguinis (= 0)	.178*	.164#
	(.085)	(.092)
Jus Soli (= 1)	.050	.048
	(.105)	(.675)

<Figure 1> shows predicted probabilities of citizenship law regime when other variables are held constant at their means. Both citizenship law regimes appear to be significant in forming party preferences on migration policies (on both dependent variables). Compared to countries in *jus sanguinis* regime, those in *jus soli* regime prefer more liberal immigration policies by 0.664 difference and more integrating policies by 0.599 difference. One concern here is that a confidence interval of *jus soli* countries is large. Although some might raise concerns on this, the result shows that parties in *jus soli* are capable to become liberal towards immigrants up to a level, which those in *jus soli* can never achieve. Conversely, parties in *jus sanguinis* hold a probability to become anti-immigration up to a level, which those in *jus soli* can never reach.

Furthermore, <Figure 2> shows how much the effect of party ideology depends on citizenship law. It is striking that party ideology is more salient in *just sanguinis* countries, but not in *jus soli* regime. This may depict a constraint that politicians *in jus soli* countries face as a consequence of granting more citizenship to permanent migrants. In other words, party ideology loses its explanatory power in assessing parties in *jus soli* regime, because both the center-left and center-right parties need to take interests of immigrants more seriously. On the contrary, because a less number of immigrants obtain a full citizenship in *jus sanguinis* countries, politicians find easier avenues to follow their party ideology in conjunction with other policy concerns. Nonetheless, these statistical works support my hypothesis that citizenship regime plays a central role in formulating politicians' preference on immigration policies.

For robustness check, I have deleted parties that are identified as radical right or left from the dataset, so that I can more accurately align the data to my own hypotheses, which only deal with center-left or center-right ideology. The results hold almost identical for both linear regressions and predicted probabilities, and thus, it seems the findings here are firm (results are not reported here).

CONCLUSION

Migration as a whole breeds multiple dimensions, and is interlinked with other policy arenas. This paper has thus specifically investigated in policies on permanent migrants, and claim that citizenship law regime plays a central role in constructing parties' preference on permanent migrants while party ideology also provides a variation in a domestic setting. Statistical works also support this argument, implying that both variables are significant, and yet, both center-right and center-left party have a higher probability to less rely on own ideology in *jus soli* regime, because permanent migrants have a higher probability to be counted as new votes.

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